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RESUMEN
ABSTRACT
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The Possibilities of ‘Materiality’ in Writing and Reading 
History
Las posibilidades de ‘materialidad’ en la escritura y la lectura 
de la historia
In this article, I investigate the role of a particular kind 
of ‘materiality’ at work in the writing and reading of 
history. This involves examining the challenges posed 
to constructivist approaches to history by various post-
linguistic-turn claims about presence and experience as 
well as by so-called post-narrativism. The core focus will 
be on outlining an argument for updating ‘narrativist’ or 
constructivist theory of history to deal with these recent 
concerns. This requires directing more attention to the 
relations between author, text, and reader, particularly 
concerning the key issues of reality, embodiment, and 
immersion. To demonstrate the value of approaching 
these relations in terms of ‘materiality,’ I consider three 
questions aimed at illuminating the balancing act between 
referentiality and invention performed in history writing 
as a genre: How can language ‘embody’ reality? How do 
referential texts encode reality? And, how could we read 
referential texts specifically with respect to reality?
Experience; Constructivism; Reception
En este artículo investigo el rol de una clase particular 
de ‘materialidad’ que opera en la escritura y la lectura 
de la historia. Esto implica examinar los desafíos 
planteados a los enfoques constructivistas de la historia 
tanto por los argumentos del giro post-lingüístico sobre 
la presencia y la experiencia como por el denomindado 
post-narrativismo. El foco central será presentar un 
argumento para actualizar la teoría de la historia 
‘narrativista’ o constructivista a fin de que esta pueda 
lidiar con esas preocupaciones recientes. Esto requiere 
dedicar mayor atención a las relaciones entre autor, texto 
y lector, particularmente respecto de los asuntos clave 
relativos a la realidad, la corporalidad (embodiment) y 
la inmersión. Para mostrar la utilidad del acercamiento a 
esas relaciones en términos de ‘materialidad’, considero 
tres preguntas que apuntan a iluminar el acto de 
equilibrarentre referencialidad e invención performado 
en la escritura de la historia como género: ¿cómo puede 
el lenguaje ‘corporizar’ (embody) la realidad? ¿Cómo 
pueden los textos referenciales codificar la realidad? 
Y ¿cómo podríamos leer los textos referenciales, 
específicamente con respecto a la realidad?
Experiencia; Constructivismo; Recepción
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It seems self-evident to say that theory and philosophy 
of history should not exist in a vacuum. After all, its main 
problems and objectives relate closely to those of numerous 
other fields in the humanities and social sciences. Yet there is 
a surprising disjuncture to be discerned as theory of history 
has been impressively resistant even to the core debates in 
‘cultural theory’ about, for example, affect theory or actor-
network theory (as well as, obviously, ‘post-ANT’) — possibly 
the most salient developments that could currently contribute 
to a reinvigorated understanding of historical production as 
well as historical literacy. Even the connection to memory and 
heritage studies has largely been ignored, as if debates could 
be conducted in isolation… even, at times, in isolation from the 
practice of history writing itself.
When borrowings do occur, they are often carried out 
in superficial ways, and discussions tend to return to pre-
linguistic-turn agendas. This is perhaps nowhere as evident as 
in the opposition of ‘narrativism’ by talk about ‘presence’ and 
‘experience’ in recent decades, a subject that I go on to discuss 
below. So, while I hope to describe some issues that might 
make these other debates more approachable from the point 
of view of theory of history as well as to outline some central 
research agendas for going forward in conceptualizing history 
as a practice of communication, my main concern here is more 
to indicate missing connections for further elaboration. To set 
up the argument, let me begin by sketching the main issues 
relating to the personal relevance of history (the thread that 
binds together the contradictory impulses and commitments at 
the heart of ‘doing’ history).
The personal relevance of history
Leaning on recent research in cognitive neuroscience to 
develop his ‘phenomenology of autobiography’ (primarily, that 
is, the experience of reading autobiographies), Arnaud Schmitt 
suggests that personal relevance could be a key factor in 
determining what is real and what is fictional. He bases his 
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argument on the finding, moving in the reverse direction, by 
which ‘real’ characters have more impact on us than ‘unreal’ 
ones. Accordingly,
what is real is what matters most to us […]. These conclusions 
rest on the (scientifically reliable?) premise that reality makes 
a stronger impression, or leaves a deeper neural mark than 
fiction (with the possible exception of pathological cases of over-
immersion in fiction). (SCHMITT 2017, p. 81)
Regardless of the extent of the generalizability from such 
findings (and Schmitt is to be commended for his wariness), 
there appears to be a similar impactfulness in play in the 
‘phenomenology’ of (reading) history texts — as there is, 
indeed, in watching the news or listening to someone recount 
their experiences of the day, for example. Even when a story 
is not the most fascinating, its ‘truthfulness’ can command our 
attention. In this sense, reality plays an undeniable role. 
But this is only part of the story regarding a personal or ‘felt’ 
relation to situations described: a second issue — and one that 
is more prominent in theoretical discussion about history — 
involves their easy identifiability. And it is in the creation of this 
(sense of) identifiability that a tension is introduced between 
‘reality’ and truthfulness, on one hand, and the familiarity of 
the form, on the other. For circumstances to be identifiable, 
they must be described in identifiable ways. As Hayden White 
puts this, the past, or
history [sic] — the real world as it evolves in time — is made 
sense of in the same way that the poet or novelist tries to make 
sense of it, i.e., by endowing what originally appears to be 
problematical and mysterious with the aspect of a recognizable, 
because it is a familiar, form. (WHITE 1978, p. 98)
There is yet a further twist, however: in addition to the 
chosen story form, personal identification and even ‘empathy’ 
are also seen to figure in the creation of any ‘felt,’ personal 
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1 - The connection 
with microhistory is 
strong in Frank Anker-
smit’s arguments for 
‘historical experience’ 
discussed below. For 
more on this, see, es-
pecially, FROEYMAN 
2016 and PAUL & VAN 
VELDHUIZEN 2018.
relation. Although discussed with respect to all referential texts, 
this may be most obvious in the boundary-case of the historical 
novel, in which reference is admittedly less important than it 
is in more ‘aggressively’ referential genres such as history, 
biography, or autobiography.
For Georg Lukácz, in his influential discussion of the 
historical novel, the evocation of the personal and concrete 
nature of historical reality demands poetic engagement and an 
appeal to experience, including identification with the actors 
from the past:
What matters therefore in the historical novel is not the re-telling 
of great historical events, but the poetic awakening of the people 
who figured in those events. What matters is that we should re-
experience the social and the human motives which led men to 
think, feel and act just as they did in historical reality. (LUKÁCZ 
1962, p. 42)
Lukácz goes on to remind us that it is less the great events of 
the past that effect this experiential awakening than ‘outwardly 
insignificant events’ (LUKÁCZ 1962, p. 42), the matters of daily 
experience and life. In this sense, microhistory, for instance, is 
a natural move toward more experiential and hence, potentially, 
‘personal’ historical representations.1
Of course, other attempts at creating experiential histories 
abound too. In these alternative forms of history writing — forms 
that depart from the purportedly objective reportage of more 
straight-forward history writing, and, indeed, of more realistic 
historical novels — the reading experience is pronounced 
and intentionally ‘literary,’ more in the manner of modernist 
fiction than has been the case for most now-conventional 
microhistories (see, for example, the playful, experimental 
styles adopted by Natalie Zemon Davis in the Prologue to 
Women on the Margins [DAVIS 1995] and James Goodman in 
Blackout [GOODMAN 2003]). The generic orientation of such 
writing forces us to maintain a referential attitude but, at the 
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same time, aesthetically induced experientiality is ramped up 
by the seductive capacity and immersiveness of experimental, 
‘literary’ forms — by their bringing that reality somehow ‘closer’ 
to us.
Ideally, such forms could make us more aware of ways 
to connect with readers and make historical insights more 
accessible while, at the same time, relying less on historians’ 
authority and ideals of objectivity. Paradoxically, they might 
provide the best route toward making historical representations 
at once personally felt and more ‘real.’ As per my title, the 
main objective of this study is to better understand both the 
writing and the reading of history and, consequently, to also 
gain better insight into history as an academic practice. In 
addition to my attempt to draw attention to the aspects of what 
I mean by ‘materiality’ here, this debate relates specifically to 
the question of history as communication.
In elaborating on these issues, I will revisit the debate 
about ‘narrative’ with respect to history, where the complex 
challenge of narrative construction has at times been 
simplified and misunderstood to the extent that readings 
are currently very polarized. Perhaps more importantly, 
I will try to connect that debate to a largely ignored focus within 
‘poststructuralism,’ broadly understood. In doing this, my goal 
is to outline three particular blind spots that seem currently 
to be the most interesting ones for going forward. These are 
loosely tied to the idea of ‘materiality,’ albeit in a sense that has 
been largely absent from debates within theory and philosophy 
of history.
Before moving on to discuss what I believe to be the main 
unappreciated concerns in this connection, a recap of the 
principal developments leading to the current debate may 
be helpful — hopefully this impressionistic ‘history’ can shed 
light on the ways in which these potential blind spots relate to 
tensions within the field today.
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The ‘stuff’ outside historical writing
Of the main developments in theory, the linguistic 
turn certainly needs no introduction, in part because of its 
dominance especially in the theory of history during the 1980s 
and 1990s, but also because of its controversial nature even 
throughout that period of relative success. To say that it needs 
no introduction is not, however, to say that there is not a 
continued need to get to know it better. Ideas falling under 
the umbrella of the linguistic turn have been subject to many 
misinterpretations and the work of its main proponents has 
been quite strangely received; within philosophy, the worst 
misreadings have arguably focused on Jacques Derrida and 
Richard Rorty; in relation to history, particularly harsh readings 
have been offered up of Hayden White, Keith Jenkins, Elizabeth 
Ermarth, Sande Cohen, and Frank Ankersmit. At the same 
time, historically oriented presentations by Michel Foucault and 
Joan Scott, for instance, have been better received in at least 
some more forward-thinking history approaches — for Foucault 
and Scott, this has perhaps been the case most notably within 
cultural history and women’s history. More recently, attempts 
to pursue similar goals and conceivably to also broaden the 
agenda of the linguistic-turn inheritance have continued in 
the pages of the journal Rethinking History and in the work 
of Martin L. Davies (2016) as well as Claire Norton and Mark 
Donnelly (2019), for example. These questions have also been 
kept alive by sporadic attacks on relativism and by virtue of 
regularly recurring debates concerning one revisionist history 
or another.
One of the most cited formulations of the linguistic turn as 
it relates to history is presented by White in his seminal essay 
‘The Historical Text as Literary Artifact’ (printed, for example, 
in WHITE 1978). Here, he enjoins us to reconsider the nature 
of historians’ work:
to consider historical narratives as what they most manifestly 
are: verbal fictions, the contents of which are as much invented 
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as found and the forms of which have more in common with 
their counterparts in literature than they have with those in the 
sciences. (WHITE 1978, p. 82)
At other times, including in this very essay, White 
(in)famously described this part of historical work in terms of 
turning fact into fiction. Although he pushes the envelope much 
further here than in expressing the more obvious need for 
personally appealing, recognizable forms (in relation to which 
I cited him above), this is clearly only a dramatization of the 
same thesis. Had these interventions not been as controversial 
as they proved to be, there might today be more agreement 
between the fields of ‘theory’ and ‘history’ regarding questions 
of construction and invention. While White later expressed 
regret for some of the more extreme provocations, there is no 
denying their core idea, however: history writing, like literature, 
requires the complex construction (‘fictioning’) of meaning, not 
simply an unearthing of facts; furthermore, history writing as 
we know it follows largely the same linguistic paths as literature 
in this meaning-making process.
Naturally, these provocations were met with numerous 
objections, but those have largely tended to rely on quite extreme 
interpretations of the initial claims, coupled with ignorance of 
the attendant qualifications about what is meant by ‘fiction,’ 
‘textuality,’ ‘construction,’ and so on. As an example: during 
one of the formative moments of the linguistic turn debate 
in theory of history, Perez Zagorin rebukes Keith Jenkins with 
what he seems to perceive as a knock-down response regarding 
Derrida’s ‘well-known dictum that there is nothing outside the 
text.’ In his denunciation, Zagorin ignores Derrida’s and others’ 
explanation of what is intended by this statement and chooses 
instead to take it literally:
On the face of it this is a very implausible proposition. It does 
not appear to be metaphorical and seems to say that everything 
that is is part of a text. Derrida puts this another way when he 
also denies that reading can get beyond the text to any sort of 
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referent or reality either historical, biographical, metaphysical, 
or other. (ZAGORIN 2000, p. 206)
Even with the clarification made here by Zagorin at 
his own initiative, the challenges to any ‘getting beyond’ 
appear to escape him as well as so many other critics of the 
linguistic turn and postmodern or deconstructive approaches 
to history. Zagorin’s intended knock-down follows up on his 
literal (non-metaphorical) reading of what it means to be 
inside a text; obviously, he says, there are things ‘beyond’ 
texts for the simple reason that texts ‘require for their physical 
realization such things as paper, ink, print, pens, parchment, 
stone, clay tablets, and so on, none of which is a text.’ 
(ZAGORIN 2000, p. 206).
Regardless of the existence of such risible readings, actual 
anti-realist positions are hard to come by, and this is something 
that should be clear also from Zagorin’s conflation of arguments 
concerning metaphysical realism (in the sense that reality exists 
irrespective of us) and naive realism (claiming that perceptions 
and experiences match and confirm reality), by which move he 
consequently attributes to ‘postmodernists’ an anti-realism in 
the strongest, crudest sense of claiming that there is no reality 
whatsoever. Even Jenkins — who may justifiably be viewed 
as taking the constructivist position furthest within theory of 
history — has been very clear to distance himself from anti-
realism. As he explains: ‘I’m a realist but a realist of a certain 
kind.’ For him, this means that
not only does such stuff exist (and has existed previously and 
will exist in the future), but that it transcends each and every 
attempt in each and every social formation to reduce it to their 
inhabitants’ experiences, vocabularies, lexicons, abstractions, 
etc. […] For it seems apparent that the actuality of ‘existence’ 
skips free of every (definitive) anthropomorphism. Yet, at the 
same time such transcendental realism does not commit me to 
metaphysical realism (namely, that we can know the way things 
are independent of the way we access them). (JENKINS 2008, 
p. 60)
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Although Jenkins’ terminology is different (his description of 
‘metaphysical realism’ here is what I would term ‘naive realism’), 
he is not denying the ‘actuality’ of ‘stuff’ but merely recognizing 
the inevitability of mediation and of impositions of meaning. 
Not even the ‘reality’ of our experiences is thus questioned, 
only our appreciation of their specific relations with actuality.
Narrativity as hostile to reality and experience?
After over half a century of fairly focused debate about 
language and representation, it is not surprising that a 
pendulum swing is taking place in theory of history as well 
as within theory and philosophy more broadly. Some of the 
suggested routes were perhaps to be expected — many even 
anticipated by more nuanced approaches within constructivism 
and poststructuralism, for instance, as I go on to indicate. 
Nonetheless, the one-sidedness of some of the extreme 
popularizations is surprising. They move forward on a number 
of conceptual and disciplinary fronts: most obviously through 
ideas of presence and experience in relation to history and 
under the umbrellas of (speculative) realism and object-
oriented ontology, for example, within continentally oriented 
philosophy. All in all, there may be said to be a general emphasis 
on ‘materiality’ (if, fortunately, not predominantly on ‘reality’) 
across the board in these efforts.
While there are sophisticated representatives of such 
approaches (particularly with regard to material remains and 
heritage, it seems), at their extremes many attempts run 
counter to the fundamental idea of mediatedness — that is, 
the problematic concerning our access to reality, an issue 
foregrounded by the majority of theoretical approaches since 
the 1960s. To be clear, this is not merely a case of their 
opposing the previously discussed straw-claim of reality not 
being ‘there’; rather, the same charges are presented also 
against the far more modest views according to which we do 
not have meaning-full access to reality ‘outside’ or ’beyond’ our 
sense-making processes. By these latter views, ‘language’ — 
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in one form or another — always gets in the way. Yet, even to 
suggest this is easily perceived as tantamount to making anti 
realist claims.
Despite the slew of elaborations regarding mediation and 
accessibility, simply ignoring all such ideas seems currently 
to be a popular tendency. With respect to the main ‘linguistic 
turn’ trend within theory and philosophy of history within 
the past decades — often (and often simplistically) referred 
to as ‘narrativism’ — this amounts to ignoring the linguistic 
problematic and treating language once more as if it were 
somehow a transparent medium. Even if the denial of these 
ideas is not always explicitly stated in the proposal of ‘new’ 
directions, it is worth asking: what else could it mean to present 
something as offering a counter to ‘narrativism,’ to ‘textualism,’ 
or to an undue focus on the linguistic turn? What could be 
presented as new and crucial ‘after’ these concerns, instead of 
more moderately calling for increased attention to their less-
discussed or less-central aspects while still remaining within a 
constructivist framework?
In relation to history writing at least, this trend has been 
building gradually, already incipient at the height of the 
linguistic turn. In his brilliant and well-timed challenge to 
conventional historical form, In 1926, Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht 
— very much in tune with linguistic-turn theory of history — 
outlined a theoretically sensitive and nuanced position aimed 
at defending ‘our’ desires for a presence of some sort in dealing 
with the past. For him, it was clear at that time that
Historical culture cannot avoid living between its endeavor to 
fulfill such desire for presence and an awareness that this is an 
impossible self-assignment. Therefore, historical culture — if it 
wishes to preserve its identity as a form of experience different 
from the experience of fiction — must try to ‘conjure’ the reality 
of past worlds, without indulging in naive analogies with magic 
but acknowledging the inevitable subjectiveness of every such 
construction of historical otherness. (GUMBRECHT 1997, p. 424, 
emphasis added2).
2 - The ‘conjuring’ of 
at least some feel-
ing of reality might 
best be undertak-
en through an em-
phasis on underde-
termination on the 
part of the historian, 
so as to leave more 
of the responsibili-
ty for interpretation 
to the reader; see 
PIHLAINEN 2017.
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Thus, still operating very much within the ‘constructivist’ 
camp and, consequently, advocating a sense of ‘irony’ regarding 
this contradiction, Gumbrecht can talk about presence while 
simultaneously invoking its impossibility as a practical limit to 
more extreme, less theoretically sophisticated attempts. As 
historians, ‘we’ may feel such a ‘desire for presence,’ but it is 
moderated by an awareness of the impossibility of anything 
but imaginary fulfillment. There is also a visible conflation 
in Gumbrecht’s argument of historians’ constructions and 
consumer desires, however: speaking more generally about 
our historical-mindedness — at least for a large part of the 
population, one assumes from his tone — Gumbrecht claims 
that
what specifically drives us toward the past is the desire to 
penetrate the boundary that separates our lives from the time 
span prior to our birth. We want to know the worlds that existed 
before we were born, and experience them directly. (GUMBRECHT 
1997, p. 419)
While this rhetorical ‘we’ may be too liberally constructed 
(it makes me at least want to shout, ‘speak for yourself!’), this 
statement appears to be a fair representation of the kind of 
romanticizing attitude to the past that clearly does motivate 
many people, historians and their readers alike, to turn to 
history: to ‘touch,’ to ‘taste,’ to ‘smell’ something of a reality 
that once was. Gumbrecht gives us an example of this that 
is certainly persuasively familiar for anyone working among 
‘traditional’ historians: ‘touching the original manuscript of a 
text whose exact words would be more easily accessible in 
a critical edition seems,’ he argues, ‘to make a difference for 
many scholars.’ (GUMBRECHT 1997, p. 419)
It bears emphasizing that this same dynamic is part of 
Zagorin’s criticism of linguistic-turn approaches in the discussion 
I reference above. In criticizing Jenkins for lack of knowledge 
about historical practice, Zagorin dismissively asks: ‘Does he 
[Jenkins] know what it is to read a manuscript written in an 
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ancient hand and determine its contextual background and its 
provenance, meaning, and significance as part of an evidential 
synthesis to which it is related?’ (ZAGORIN 2000, p. 202) 
Apparently, such contact with the past somehow (magically?) 
contributes to the significance of historical studies.
What is notable in outlining the debate around these 
positions is that, when elaborating on this issue in 1997, 
Gumbrecht falls back to a relatively ‘safe’ position. He suggests 
— but does not yet quite make — a break with the ‘fiction’ 
debate. As he quite correctly notes: ‘as soon as historical 
culture openly opts for this desire for re-presentation (which 
is not a given), it cannot help being ironic, for it then re-
presents the past as a “reality” though it knows that all re-
presentations are simulacra.’ (GUMBRECHT 1997, p. 424) 
He later returns to the suggestion that it might be possible to 
somehow present or ‘presentify’ the past (or, to be precise, 
objects of the past) more explicitly. This time, he takes things 
a little further, however, arguing that
instead of asking for a meaning, presentification pushes us in 
a different direction. The desire for presence makes us imagine 
how we would have related, intellectually and with our bodies, to 
certain objects (rather than ask what those objects ‘mean’) if we 
had encountered them in their own historical everyday worlds. 
(GUMBRECHT 2004, p. 124)
Although he in part continues to connect this with his earlier 
formulation of ‘conjuring up the past,’ this latter view seems 
more a parsing of what it means to ‘mean’ than a significant 
objection in itself. After all, relating intellectually or relating 
with the body are essentially still forms of meaning-making in a 
constructivist sense, regardless of whether we encounter things 
‘directly’ in their ‘original’ context or in an imaginary mode, as 
historical traces in some ‘artificial’ context. Meaning is always 
only an attribution and imposition, but it is also something that 
we can never avoid ‘adding’ when relating (to) something.
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That said, it is important to note that the phenomenological 
sentiment here is desperately in need of further work in 
connection with history and should not be too hastily rejected. 
Indeed, we may go further in this regard with what I will refer 
to as ‘materiality’. I will come to that soon. My intention in 
taking Gumbrecht to task in such a detailed fashion here, then, 
is less to point to difficulties with his position than to indicate 
the direction of the shift that has taken place in thinking about 
presence — first as a ‘conjuring’ type of parlor trick performed 
by reasonably theoretically self-aware historians, but later 
(now?) increasingly in some supposedly more ‘authentic’ way. 
Before moving on to the possible ways of following up on 
several aspects of the kind of presence suggested by this more 
basic phenomenological attitude, I want to briefly look at what, 
for me, are some routes not to be taken.
For this purpose, I turn to Frank Ankersmit’s key provocation 
regarding ‘historical experience.’ While Ankersmit has shifted 
‘from narrative to experience’ with some forcefulness (as 
insightfully observed by Ewa Domanska [2009] and elaborated 
in detail by Peter Icke [2012]), he is no less radical with this 
latter focus. In promoting this new position, he claims that 
there may well be ways for historians to ‘enter into a real, 
authentic, and “experiential” relationship to the past – that is, 
into a relationship that is not contaminated by historiographical 
tradition, disciplinary presuppositions, and linguistic structures.’ 
(ANKERSMIT 2005, p. 4) If substantiated, this would amount 
to a significant challenge to linguistic-turn thinking. Imagine it: 
to somehow bypass existing discursive traditions and linguistic 
practices…3
Ankersmit takes this further, arguing that our debates 
regarding history might — through historians’ embrace of this 
kind of ‘authentic’ relationship — then also shift to focus on 
‘historical experience, that is, on how we experience the past 
and on how this experience of the past may come into being 
by a movement comprising at the same time the discovery 
and the recovery of the past.’ (ANKERSMIT 2005, p. 9) 
3 - If read 
more modestly, 
however, Ankersmit’s 
focus is not far from 
Joan Scott’s much 
earlier intervention 
regarding the role of 
lived experience in 
historians’ interpre-
tive work (cf. SCOTT 
1991).
60
Kalle Pihlainen
Hist. Historiogr. v. 12, n. 31, set.-dez., ano 2019, p. 47-81 - DOI 10.15848/hh.v12i31.1527
Although attending to the combination of discovery and 
recovery certainly makes sense both in this context and as an 
argument about approaching the past in general, tying this to 
the idea of an ‘experiential’ relationship to history as if that 
connection were already something available and established 
seems premature. Historians are obviously intent on discovering 
and recovering as much as, for example, uncovering, and it is 
of crucial importance for the discipline that we examine how 
these desires tie in with personal attitudes to the historical past. 
But how can our experience connect us to that distant past? 
(Beyond, that is, the kind of romantic or fetishizing attitudes 
in dealing with material remains, for example, as described by 
Gumbrecht in the citation above.)
Despite the way in which Ankersmit runs ideas of personal 
experience and the work of the historian together, it seems 
that the first part of his formulation was intended primarily 
as a provocation and is thus presented in this exaggerated 
form; certainly there is no denying its success in inspiring vocal 
spokespeople both for and against ‘historical experience.’4 Yet, 
while it was undeniably a timely and contagious sentiment — one 
that captured the imaginations of many — the idea is premised 
on a complete rejection of some of the established problems 
and understandings regarding historical representation and 
language. More worryingly, going forward, it has been received 
as a suggestion that we could now reasonably forget about 
‘narrativist’ or linguistic-turn debates — as if the underlying 
issues had somehow been resolved.5 In going so directly 
against the core idea of mediation, it should not, however, be 
enough to simply proclaim that we need not concentrate on 
such issues any longer.
Making room for ‘materiality’
What seems most urgent in the current conjuncture, then, is 
to seek real dialogue between these two key issues in theorizing 
historical work (those of experience and linguistic construction), 
instead of presenting them as mutually excluding as a matter 
4 - For an example 
of the reception, see 
CHORELL 2006; for 
its contextualization 
in Ankersmit’s ove-
rall thought, see VAN 
DER DUSSEN 2016 
and PAUL & VAN VEL-
DHUIZEN 2018.
5 - See, for exam-
ple, Anton Froeyman 
(2016, p. 81 ff.), who 
explores the possi-
bility furthest. More 
moderately, Jonathan 
Menezes (2018), for 
one, reads Ankers-
mit’s position as one 
of ‘suspending’ rather 
than rejecting langua-
ge when focusing on 
experience.
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of principle. This is so particularly in trying to understand the 
question of what it is about history that ‘speaks’ to us. How is 
it that history (even when understood in the stricter sense of 
disciplinary history writing) can be important to us in personal 
and not only societal ways? While the answer to this question 
may at first seem to rest solely on the shoulders of the audience 
— the consumers of historical stories — and thus as relating 
more to experience, responsibility also rests with the producers 
and their storytelling skills and effort.
In this way, viewing ‘narrativism,’ for instance, as a hindrance 
to talking about experience and reality prevents us from asking 
better questions about historical work and its consumption. 
It further leads proponents of ‘narrativist’ versus ‘realist’ or 
‘materialist’ positions to return to debates that have already 
been had at the early stages of the linguistic turn, with the 
consequence that current discourse must rehearse this same 
vicious circle — fact or fiction, reality or language, experience or 
storytelling, and so on. Some recent claims that serve to create 
an impasse to the elaboration of more theoretically nuanced 
positions include talk about it now being time to move ‘beyond’ 
language, or to think ‘after narrativism’ (see, for example, the 
special issue of History and Theory, ‘After Narrativism’ [v. 54, 
n. 2, 2015]). But this can only lead to a ‘rinse and repeat’ of 
the whole, now-familiar debate about history or, alternatively, 
leads us off on a tangent instead, to questions that are largely 
unrelated to history practices — to questions of the nature 
of experience and knowledge in general, for instance, or to 
substantive queries about time, societal change, and the like.
Admittedly, there is a balancing act to be carried out 
regarding the relevance of theoretical work when a particular 
approach is viewed as passé within a given field. The answer 
for retrieving relevance should not be an endless search for 
novelty, however, often resulting in a turning back of the clock 
and the reinvention of previous positions, but, instead, mining 
the work and insights already there, supplementing them as 
necessary. In such situations, attention to detail is needed for 
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taking the discussion forward. With respect to discussions of 
‘narrativism’ in history this involves, hopefully, finally getting to 
talk about the meaning and relevance of constructivist thinking 
for actual history practices instead of arguing about very basic 
epistemological questions.
Charting this more interesting ground between extreme 
formulations of ‘nothing outside language’ and ‘immediate 
experience’ — in fact simply working through these discussions 
with more care and nuance — is important to ‘history’ topics 
involving broader analyses of ‘historicity’ (including debates in 
memory studies, public history, popular histories, and so on). 
Simply accepting these positions as in fundamental conflict 
would amount to saying that the debate regarding history has 
failed, and thus indeed to accede to the desire that we turn to 
something ‘new’ instead… Yet, while there are endless topics 
to tackle, most of them do not contribute to understanding 
‘history’ practices even in the broadest sense — something 
that should arguably still be the main interest of theoretical 
work regarding history.
In what follows, I want to address all this in terms of 
the place of ‘materiality’ in texts and will proceed via three 
questions. To begin, I touch on the general issue of how reality 
can be thought of as present in language: How does language 
‘embody’ reality? After this, I will discuss two further questions 
that relate to history writing specifically. How do referential 
texts encode reality? And: How do we read referential texts 
with respect to reality? Through a quick discussion of these 
three questions, I hope to suggest that the ‘old’ debate about 
constructivism and poststructuralism still has much to give, 
particularly relating to the area between the two extreme 
straw-positions described.
But, before turning to these aspects of ‘materiality,’ there 
is a need to rehearse the key ideas that should be retained 
from ‘narrativist’ discussions in order for further thinking on 
these matters to be sustainable. What is it we should hold 
on to from linguistic-turn debates? What do we want to keep 
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from at least the more sophisticated accounts of ‘narrativism,’ 
‘constructivism,’ or ‘poststructuralism’ (or from ‘relativism’ or 
‘postmodernism’ for that matter) to ensure that we do not just 
reset the debate? How should we read these efforts better 
and avoid reducing them to derisory ‘isms’ to be handily set in 
opposition to unexacting attitudes of ‘realism’?
Perhaps a little surprisingly, what needs to be remembered 
is fairly underwhelming and probably quite clear to most 
historians from their practices, even if not always clearly 
articulated in theoretical terms. Overall, linguistic-turn thinking 
brings with it an increased sensitivity to language and poetics. 
With respect to history, this involves directing attention to the 
writing of history; even when viewed from a ‘narrativist’ or 
narrative theory of history perspective, the research side of 
things works well, and hence the challenge that this kind of 
theory raises is, in the most basic sense, not epistemological.6 
Questions regarding the establishment of individual facts 
are simply bracketed so that we can proceed to focus on the 
construction of stories from these facts instead. This involves 
accepting the idea of so-called singular existential statements 
(‘facts’) that are sufficiently authoritatively established by 
the profession as not to face the same challenge as complex 
emplotments.
While this is obviously a compromise, it is a necessary one 
if we wish to talk about what histories are instead of returning 
to more fundamental questions of reference, better belonging 
to the sphere of philosophy of language, for instance. Clearly, 
‘facts’ are no safer from the basic philosophical problems 
of representation and reference than are more complex 
representations. But we would never get to discuss issues 
specific to history writing if we were to insist on first resolving 
this debate regarding what can be described as its ‘building 
blocks.’
In this same vein, it needs to be understood that ‘narrative’ 
and ‘narrativization’ do not imply a particular form as suggested 
by some critics of ‘narrativism’ (see, for example, CARR 1986 
6 - White acknowl-
edges this alongside 
his early provoca-
tions. For him, we 
always also have re-
course to ‘such crite-
ria as responsibility to 
the rules of evidence, 
the relative fullness 
of narrative detail, 
logical consistency, 
and the like.’ (WHITE 
1978, p. 97)
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and KUUKKANEN 2015, who both seem to insist that the term 
implies an uncomplicated, Aristotelian tripartite beginning-
middle-end structure). Against this overly simplified view of the 
practice, ‘narrativization’ merely means a process of storying 
— the creation of a story by connecting things into a larger 
whole in a process of sense-making, regardless of how linear 
and straightforward or fragmentary and complex the resulting 
‘narrative.’ The fundamental point is, then, to remind that 
there is no ‘entailment’ from facts to meaning (that is, there 
is no moving from ‘is’ to ‘ought’ in the classic Humean sense). 
Thus, whatever the things we know, they cannot ‘innocently’ 
suggest to us evaluations or provide us with the meaning of 
a specific set of historical events, for instance. In this way, 
there is a harsh disconnect between knowing things (‘facts’) 
and making interpretations. The move from one to the other 
is always mediated by historians through their interpretative, 
sense-making processes. This is something we know all too 
well from historical practice, of course, but often still fail to 
articulate clearly in theoretical debates.
Centrally, from a ‘narrativist’ or, better, constructivist point 
of view, none of this is to say that we are free to operate in 
‘anti-realist’ or otherwise fully unconstrained ways. History is 
not just what we wish to make of it — even if we discount the 
crucial role of facts and research — already for the very basic 
reason that we emplot reality in familiar forms and following 
the various linguistic and cultural rules and expectations that 
we inhabit. A reminder of this from White to pre-empt any such 
objections before proceeding:
The historian shares with his audience general notions of the 
forms that significant human situations must take by virtue of 
his participation in the specific processes of sense-making which 
identify him as a member of one cultural endowment rather than 
another. (WHITE 1978, p. 86)
The challenge, then, is to keep sight of this quite practical 
aspect of constructivism and see where it might still lead 
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us. In the present context this translates specifically to the 
question: Where and how might ‘historical experience’ and 
textually produced experientiality à la narrative theory overlap 
sufficiently for the former to be theoretically justified? That is, 
what are the preconditions against which we can talk about 
the communication of something that could sensibly count as 
‘historical experience’?
A) How is reality in language?
The first kind of ‘materiality’ that I can only all-too-briefly 
gesture to here centers on the very basic question of how 
language ‘embodies’ reality. Naturally, we have an everyday 
agreement to use language referentially on many — if not most 
— occasions. And the justification for this practice comes from 
a straightforward pragmatic consideration: most of the time it 
works. But this still leaves open the question of whether and 
how reality is present in language, encoded into it.
The idea of embodied materiality I want to invoke here 
has a long tradition in phenomenological thinking, with the 
classic example of the hammer offering the easiest entry-
point. While that example does not yet connect directly with 
language, it provides an easy route to articulating the relation 
between material objects and embodied affordances. (It is also 
very much in line with the sentiment expressed by Gumbrecht 
that I cited earlier, concerning our possible relations to 
objects.) In its simplest form: when we encounter a hammer 
and we grasp it, it ‘communicates’ to us the underlying 
purpose or intention behind it. It does this through its ready 
graspability, the weighting and the heft — and its use is 
intuitively clear as a result of our parallel embodied capacities. 
The same may be even clearer with something like a pillow 
or a baseball bat, for example, where options for utilisation 
are arguably more strictly limited by the correspondence of 
the object to our ‘constitution’ and experiences of the world 
(possibly ‘primordial’ experiences, as Heidegger at times 
phrases this). And to some extent, this is true of every artifact, 
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albeit in diminishing degrees with increases in complexity and 
abstraction.
The need to rescue glossed aspects of more sophisticated 
theorizing from their collapse into ‘isms’ is just as urgent with 
respect to much of the theory that undergirds the linguistic turn 
as it is in the case of ‘narrativism’ and related simplifications: 
the point of contact between language and embodiment 
has been an object of attention for existentialism as well as 
poststructuralism, even though both are mostly discussed in 
terms of an exaggerated focus on description and language as 
constitutive. While they attend to representation in what can 
arguably be termed a relativist way, they do take embodiedness 
(and the related question of materiality) into account and 
attribute some influence to it vis-á-vis linguistic practices — 
despite that dimension often being ignored by their critics (with 
the exception of the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, of course, 
for whom the embodied dimension plays a far more integral 
role than it did for his contemporaries and hence has not been 
similarly ignored). Since they also arguably provide the most 
significant framework for the linguistic turn, this aspect should 
not be too easily dismissed.
To give some brief examples: thinkers like Emmanuel 
Levinas and Jean-Paul Sartre admittedly do consider ethics 
and choice in relatively unrestrained ways, yet Levinas also 
relies on the existence of ‘phenomenological structures’ 
(‘here,’ ‘near/far,’ and so on) and attributes a great deal to 
our embodied experiences (with respect to ‘The Dwelling,’ for 
example in LEVINAS 1969) whereas Sartre bases the move 
to verbalizations of our internal states on the other’s fixing 
of us as our body for them (SARTRE 1969, particularly the 
chapter, ‘The Body’). Similar commitments can be discerned 
in the work of ‘poststructuralist’ thinkers, despite the typical 
claims made about their overt and even ‘absurd’ emphasis 
of language as somehow free-floating. (This partly overlaps 
with the arguments for ‘anti-realism’ and ‘anything goes,’ 
which are directed at these strands of thinking too, as already 
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discussed above in relation to Derrida.) But reading, for 
example, Derrida on Jean-Luc Nancy or Nancy on ‘touch,’ 
the embodied or corporeal aspect and its connection with 
language-use cannot be dismissed (see DERRIDA 2005; NANCY 
1993). This same concern is equally evident in Luce Irigaray 
when speaking of ‘touch’ (see, for example, IRIGARAY 1985, 
especially the last chapter, ‘When Our Lips Speak Together’), 
in Hélène Cixous’ classic ‘The Laugh of the Medusa’ (CIXOUS 
1976) or even in Roland Barthes’ Pleasure of the Text (BARTHES 
1975).
Another presentation of this connection — albeit moving 
from language ‘down’ to embodiment, as it were — can of 
course also be found in Judith Butler and Gayatri Spivak, who 
have been intent on examining it from the point of view of 
an idea of representational violence (in line with Derrida’s 
famous formulation in Of Grammatology; see, for example, 
BUTLER 1997 and SPIVAK 1990). For them, approaching 
this particular ‘material’ relation from a more radically 
constructivist point of view is an urgent task in order to be 
able to demonstrate the harmful, essentializing impacts of 
language. Hence also the resistance to ideas that might 
be read to suggest naturalization of (female) corporeality. 
But, despite the importance of understanding the workings of 
representational, linguistic violence, the connected ‘material’ 
connections and conditions need to be examined too. In this 
limited way at least, experiences of reality and language can be 
seen to go hand-in-hand in the approaches that inform current 
constructivist views.7
Obviously, this particular kind of ‘materiality’ also relates to 
both writing and reading, and I will come to those next. But, first, 
it is essential to recognize that it forms an underlying condition 
to everything else: reality and meaning are inseparable in our 
(embodied) experience. Or, as Merleau-Ponty famously put it: 
‘Because we are in the world, we are condemned to meaning.’ 
(MERLEAU-PONTY 2002, p. xix) But this is not to say that 
meanings are determined, since language has a life of its own 
7 - These are by no 
means the only route 
to the connection be-
tween language and 
physical reality. Ge-
org Lakoff and Mark 
Johnson, for instance, 
convincingly outline 
many ‘embodied ca-
tegories’ and bodily 
metaphors operati-
ve in language-use 
(LAKOFF & JOHNSON 
1980).
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too, and even someone like Merleau-Ponty has to take a very 
long route to demonstrate how the spheres of embodiment and 
language are united in ‘gesture,’ for example (see MERLEAU-
PONTY 2002, p. 213–215).
What, then, if the overlap between language and materiality 
is so slight and difficult to place, might be the main take-
away from attending to embodiment in this way for referential 
representations like history? Most importantly — because 
the practical, directly referential connection of language to 
reality can be there or not, because, that is, we can use it 
to refer and to create — this underlines the fact that even 
referential constructions will be suasive and seductive. The 
constant shifting between reference and invention contains the 
possibility of an immersive experience (remember White’s point 
that histories ‘have more in common with their counterparts in 
literature than they have with those in the sciences…’), and we 
are accustomed to crossing the boundary between reference 
and immersion without explicit acknowledgment. It seems 
important to acknowledge that these are two different modes, 
however, and immersion is not always a desirable condition. 
This relates to the two further questions below, both having to 
do with the distinctness of referential texts.
B) How is reality encoded in referential texts?
For debates about history writing, looking at language in 
terms of both of these modes — that is: in terms of reference and 
realism, on one hand, and invention and immersion, on the other 
— can hopefully assist in overcoming the worst of the either-
or debates and in shaking off some of the underlying intuitive, 
misleading attitudes. The key challenge then becomes one of 
understanding the connection and working dynamic between 
a pragmatic ‘contact’ with reality and ‘literary’ immersiveness 
in attempts to write about the past. How is reality present 
in these texts? Or, more precisely, how do overtly referential 
texts encode and embed reality?
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Specifically, for referential texts as opposed to fiction, a 
crucial ‘mistake’ introduced by following too closely on the heels 
of a literary theory approach has involved the professed ‘death 
of the author.’ While this has not been substantially elaborated 
within theory of history, the implications of looking at history 
writing rather than ‘behind’ it to the intentions of the author has 
been part and parcel of a textualist approach. Combined with 
the epistemological problematics involved in history writing and 
historians’ explicit attempts to deal with them, this attitude has 
undoubtedly compounded the difficulties historians have had 
in accepting constructivist views. Given the challenges history 
faces as a practice, a break with extreme textualist positions 
is warranted on this point, however, and authorial intentions 
need (cautiously) to be brought back to the debates.
A key outcome of neglecting the historian (as author) 
in textual readings has involved ignoring the writer-reader 
contract in play in history (for more on this, see PIHLAINEN 
2017; 2019a; 2019b and TAMM 2014). Yet part of this 
contract is formed by the historian’s promise to be truthful 
— and, in this sense, the historian-as-writer and specifically 
the intentions involved constitute our only conduit to ‘reality,’ 
however tenuous. Textually, this connection is present in the 
form of factual statements and the literary decisions needed to 
accommodate them. Although this claim clearly calls for some 
caveats, at its core it amounts to saying that — because of genre 
commitments, including the particular promise to be truthful 
— we are, as historians, constrained by all the practices that 
fall under the admittedly all-too-vague umbrella of ‘historical 
method’; chief among these: to aim not to ‘distort’ things (to 
seek some kind of match or ‘correspondence’ with what is 
known) and to include all relevant facts (to be ‘comprehensive’ 
in our interpretations). 
If we can agree on the relevance of intentional engagement 
on this basic level, the exhumation of the author does not 
necessarily need to go further. Recognition of this commitment 
is a sufficient reminder that there are interruptions in 
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the text that result from and echo historians’ referential 
commitments. Thus, when a text is taken seriously, these 
commitments can also be seen as producing textual markers 
— markers that can be ‘read back’ as long as one remains 
constantly curious for them (as long, that is, as one then, as 
a reader, continues to honor that same referential contract 
and resists immersion into a fully fictional reading mode). 
On this level, simply the aim of inclusiveness can be argued to 
effect a disruption to ‘purely’ fictional form: a historians’ hands 
are tied with respect to literary invention and this interrupts 
the ‘literariness’ of history texts — as with any referential text. 
At the very least, textual invention proceeds ‘facts first’ rather 
than from the storyline.8
Such interruptions to overall literary form are hard to 
demonstrate, since, as readers, we tend to read everything for 
broader meaning and significance. Yet, some of the key generic 
disruptors we encounter in history texts are fairly obvious: 
Firstly, facts (‘singular existential statements’) tend to be 
‘realistic.’ Thus, even when a particular fact appears to involve 
broader meaning ‘in itself’ (something as trivial as ‘Trump 
trumps Clinton’ or as conspiracy-minded as the appearance 
of a 9/11 ‘prediction’ in The Simpsons four years prior to the 
event, for example), we may note this with some curiosity but 
tend not to read it as meaningful. Admittedly, we overlook 
such ‘meaning’ in part as a consequence of the referential 
genre commitments and the underlying understanding relating 
to reality; but the key to differentiating between referential 
and ‘fictional’ processes here is not in the existence of 
individual instances of this kind of potential meaning, but in 
the coincidence of their overall direction when more of them 
are present. Secondly, in line with this, history texts present 
references to be followed up. They read outwards. Again, this 
could be seen as a practice of ‘truth-creation’ that could be 
used effectively in fictional writing too, but in referential texts 
it produces interference (and, sometimes, when references 
are not employed in this usual way, histories are accused of 
being too free with their facts). Thirdly, point-of-view tends to 
8 - For an elaboration 
of this dynamic, see 
Pihlainen 2017.
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be severely limited and subject-positions are largely narrated 
without recourse to internal states. So, while histories may 
incorporate different perspectives, distinct storylines, parallel 
and intersecting objectives, and so on, they tend to reject even 
very basic literary conceits that go against realist expectations. 
While not an active interruption, this realistic mode limits the 
meaning-making process in much the same way as do more 
explicit referential commitments.
All this (and much more) works as an interruption to any 
properly literary meaning-making processes. And it thus makes 
the kind of aesthetic closure described in literary criticism more 
difficult to achieve. Polyphony, for instance, can be a strategic 
choice for a fictional text. But, for referential writing, at least 
some of these interruptions unavoidably leak over to infringe 
on the storyline and the text’s aesthetic coherence. In this 
key aspect, referential text production is not led by form and 
meaning-making, as is the case for fiction. So, even though 
there is always a ‘content to the form,’ that content is not 
as comprehensive and controlled because of these resistant 
elements — because of this resistant materiality. And, in this 
respect, there is a difference between the kind of ideological 
meaning-imposition suggested by White (‘the content of the 
form’) in emplotments for history and an aesthetic closure 
that involves firmer control of the meaning-making impact of 
individual textual elements, as sometimes postulated in literary 
theory.
Critically, a negotiation necessarily takes place in referential 
text production between the ‘brute facticity’ that is the 
touchstone of referential representations and the immersivity 
that is inevitably introduced by the textual process — between 
the two contending modes that such representation is forced 
to move between. And this negotiation leaves textual traces. 
But why be concerned with this? What is the significance of 
these kinds of disturbances in referential texts? Ultimately, this 
significance is only realized in the reading process.
72
Kalle Pihlainen
Hist. Historiogr. v. 12, n. 31, set.-dez., ano 2019, p. 47-81 - DOI 10.15848/hh.v12i31.1527
C) How do we read referential texts?
The third relevant aspect of ‘materiality’ that I want to 
articulate in this connection involves our specific commitments 
as readers with respect to referential texts. The question is: 
How are referential texts read differently from non-referential 
ones? Crucially, how are they read back for their reality?
Considering the strong arguments for textuality, and in 
particular their separation of meanings from intentions in the 
process of text production, it seems safe to say that the kinds 
of interruptions created by referential commitments of history 
writing are by themselves insufficient to establish a referential 
reading practice. To be effective, such textual interruptions 
require the complicity of the reader — the consummation of 
the contract between the writer and the reader, as it were. 
Without it, these interruptions are always in danger of being lost 
within the overall immersivity created even by these expressly 
referential storytelling practices. (This is only a somewhat milder 
manifestation of the ‘impossible self-assignment’ involved 
in history, cited from Gumbrecht above: here the referential 
interruptions that constitute the aspect of presence available 
to us in history writing are repeatedly covered and concealed 
by the fictional, immersive pull of the story.) To make this side 
of the referential commitment better visible, the practice of 
reading — something that has been given far too little attention 
in the theory of history (see AHLBÄCK 2007; PIHLAINEN 2017; 
ROTH 2018) — needs to be discussed explicitly.
It seems safe to assume that readers are positioned 
differently by a referential reading contract than they would 
be by a ‘fictional’ or more explicitly literary one. Importantly, 
there is an understanding of sorts regarding the premises and 
expectations directed at the text as well as collusion regarding 
referentiality. Without this ‘materiality’ reaching into the reading 
— without the reader’s mindfulness of reality as a part of the 
communication — referential writing would simply not make 
sense as a genre. Arnaud Schmitt formulates this brilliantly in 
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the case of autobiography, and I want to quote him at some 
length to do justice to his argument:
the phenomenology of fiction originates in the childhood 
experiences of games and make-believe. What is the point of 
autobiography if it is based on similar experiences? If it gives 
rise to a ‘rapt state’? I am not saying that it is not able to give 
rise to such a state, I am only asking if it is meant to. In other 
words, fiction dictates the phenomenology it creates, but, up 
to a certain point, autobiography should be monitored by the 
reader who can curb her regression in order to fully experience 
the referentiality of a self-narrative. (SCHMITT 2017, p. 97)
Clearly, the same question applies to history: What is the 
point if it (only) creates a ‘fictional’ experience for us? And if one 
accepts that ‘doing’ history indeed has a referential purpose, 
then the same kind of self-monitoring should be expected of 
readers when they read histories. Readers should not immerse 
themselves in history writing to the extent that their reading 
experience (the ‘phenomenology’ of the reading) is dictated 
exclusively by the text. But, to return to Schmitt:
To go back to autobiography, it is then my contention that 
immersion neutralizes the referential potential of this narrative 
modality, and as already stated, without this referential 
branching out, autobiography does not make any generic sense. 
An autobiographical pact is not enough: it simply is a plea on 
the part of authors, a desperate invitation to read them as they 
want to be read, as they intended to while they were writing 
their texts. The best autobiographers can do is leave blatant 
paratextual traces and hope for the best: that the reader will 
agree not to lose sight of them. (SCHMITT 2017, p. 97)
Schmitt does not see all this happening without some kind 
of empathy. The reader needs to be empathic — and respectful, 
perhaps, in the tradition of Buber and Levinas — to the lived 
experience of the author. It should be remembered, however, 
that Schmitt is speaking explicitly about self-narratives. And 
because self-narratives involve a more direct communication 
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(because, that is, at least ostensibly the experience and reality 
to be communicated reside with the author), self-interruptions 
and empathy also have a different objective. To ‘see’ or ‘hear’ 
the other.9
When, as in the case of history, the situations and events are 
not connected with the author, postulating this same dynamic 
becomes more difficult, however. The experiences described are 
not the historian’s own and there is no parallel to the privileged 
position or ‘access’ of an autobiographical writer. So, if we were 
to choose to try to look behind the presentation at the author 
in the manner suggested by Schmitt for autobiography, we 
would still remain many times removed from the actual stuff of 
the ‘historical’ realities that constitute the object of a historical 
representation. (Once again: this is not intended as a comment 
about the factual standing of a description, but rather to point 
out that there is no additional ‘experiential’ privilege involved 
in historical representations that we can be called on to respect 
as part of the communication, as in autobiography through 
acknowledging the figure and life of the author.) Given this, 
it may well be the case that the experiential break between 
historical subjects and the historian’s work is too significant 
to ‘overlook’ in the same way as the more immediate textual 
processes between author and reader.
What makes the ‘historical’ experience personal to us is not, 
then, as much the recognition of the subject’s experiences and 
reality (that is to say, not our ‘communication’ with subjects 
from the past) as it is the recognition of the storytelling skills 
and power of the historian-author, coupled with our complicity 
in the game of history writing and reading. The historian’s 
ability to evoke emotional effects in us is not based in the same 
way on the reality of the objects of representation but, instead, 
rests on the mutual agreement to proceed together in this 
conceit in a self-aware way, recognizing the twofold fictioning 
required. This is not to say that our belief in the existence of 
the objects and events plays no part, of course, only that it too 
is part of the game.
9 - Here, in connec-
tion with autobiogra-
phy, it is easy to see 
how the Levinasian 
idea of the face-to-
face can be helpful. 
For an attempt to ex-
tend this possibility to 
history, see FROEY-
MAN 2016.
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Conclusion
So, what does this all amount to? What could it mean for 
thinking about history and for the ways in which we theorize 
historical practice? If we accept that the opposition of the 
straw-figures of ‘only language’ and ‘direct experience’ are at 
logger-heads in an irresolvable way, the obvious course would 
be to try to rethink these attitudes in more sophisticated ways 
— ways which are, in fact, already present in much of the 
underlying philosophical and theoretical traditions, and which 
can assist in elaborating on the details of the relation between 
‘narrativity’ and ‘experience.’ The worst thing that we can do 
is accept their presentation as mutually exclusive and ally with 
one at the expense of the other.
To be sure, reality is ‘present’; but it is always mediated 
in multiple ways even in ‘immediate’ sensory experience, let 
alone writing. So, because referential writing is still writing — 
because, that is, it is constructed, fictioned, rhetorical, poetic, 
and so on — its referential commitments are vulnerable, and 
it needs to (strategically) curb its fantastic and immersive 
tendencies. Here, pursuing ‘materiality’ may offer useful 
insights for rethinking historical practice, particularly if we 
examine it in terms of the communication of that materiality 
on at least the three levels indicated.
Important, then, is attending to reference, first, in the 
fundamental terms of language interacting with reality, 
particularly through embodiment. While this is a difficult issue 
and does not necessarily need to be theorized to a great 
extent for purposes of history writing, existing theoretical 
elaborations can aid in analyzing actual text production. 
Fortunately, history writing has additional strengths to help 
remind of its referentiality. These result from the ‘agreement’ or 
understanding that its production and consumption involve an 
attempt to communicate truthfully about reality. Hence, second, 
we should give due consideration to the textual interruptions 
effected by referential materials and strategies — the resistant, 
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residual ‘materiality’ resulting from the historian’s promise. 
The writer’s commitment to facts interrupts semiotic meaning-
making processes and, consequently, the text incorporates 
interruptions to its ‘literariness.’ Ideally, these could take 
the form of polyphony, lack of formal closure, expressed 
doubts, elaboration of alternative possibilities, recognition 
of the contingency of events as well as irony concerning 
representational practices. But they will also obviously include 
straightforward extra-textual markers such as generic labeling, 
references, notes, and so forth.
Third, we should explore strategies that help readers read 
for reference and refuse immersion (this is the point at which 
the writer’s commitments are actualized, after all). Readers 
usually do ascertain the commitments of a text correctly 
and can self-interrupt to keep their side of the referential 
agreement. But, in cases where readers may prefer immersion 
(such as when reading more popular accounts of commonly 
romanticized periods or events, for instance), historians are 
faced with a harder challenge. We may want to persuade readers 
out of immersive attitudes by changing our representational 
strategies and reinforcing the material connection in the text 
(by increasing complexity, inducing confusion, appealing 
to disruptive embodied experiences, and so on). But ‘felt,’ 
personal relevance can always be achieved by either route 
and our specific emphasis ultimately depends on subjective 
preferences and level of historical-mindedness.
What needs to be remembered is that ‘presence’ and 
‘reality’ cannot save us, in themselves, or subdue the poetic 
dimension of language. They cannot, in the end, prevent the 
kind of ‘fictionalization’ and immersive opportunities outlined 
even by simplified ‘narrativism,’ for example, from taking 
place. There is always sufficient overlap between fictional and 
referential texts for the readers of referential ones to ignore 
connections to reality if they wish. And perhaps, at times, they 
do so even when they have not expressly willed it: language 
is seductive and — almost by default through being readers — 
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our imagination is engaged, leading us to more easily welcome 
immersion. Ideally, however, this dynamic hands responsibility 
over to the reader: we can try to read for ‘understanding’ others 
and hence for reality and we can read for pleasure and perhaps 
some deeper awareness of the human condition.
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